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Abstract
Blame and praise sometimes have a seemingly paradoxical effect: blame after failure sometimes leads to the impression that the recipient
has a high ability. In contrast, praise after success can lead to an inference of low ability. Several studies showed this effect and its relation
to concurrent sympathy ratings as well as to cognitive schemas underlying these estimations. The present study is the first to focus on
differences across the adult lifespan regarding peoples’ ability and sympathy estimations of praised or blamed individuals. In this context, the
causal schemas underlying peoples’ judgments were also investigated. The results show that seemingly paradoxical ability estimations were
independent of age in contrast to reversed ability estimations (i.e., a praised individual is perceived as more capable than a blamed individual)
decreasing with age. Moreover, age affected the estimation of a teacher’s sympathy for blamed and praised students in terms of a universal
decrease with age. Finally, exclusive ability-related causal schemas were primarily used by older people and facilitated the occurrence of
seemingly paradoxical ability estimations. The results provide a first base for future research on this largely neglected topic.
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Introduction
Evaluative behavior has an informative function since it provides data about how the ability of the recipient is
perceived by the evaluating person (Meyer, 1982). When someone is blamed after failure in a performance setting
(i.e., someone finds fault in somebody’s performance), this can lead to an inference of high ability. In contrast,
praise after success (in terms of expressing commendation for a good performance) can lead the recipient or an
impartial observer to the impression that the ability of the recipient is estimated as low by the praising person.
This effect might seem paradoxical at first sight and hence was labeled as the “paradoxical effect” on ability attri-
bution that was shown by various studies (e.g., Barker & Graham, 1987; Binser & Försterling, 2004; Hofer, 1985;
Meyer et al., 1979; Miller & Hom, 1996; Möller, 1999; Reisenzein, Debler, & Siemer, 1992). However, Möller
(1999) pointed out that this effect is not actually paradoxical, rather it only appears paradoxical. Indeed, different
models have been proposed which try to explain this effect:
Attribution Model
On the basis of two principles from attribution theory, we can explain such seemingly paradoxical ability estimations:
on the one hand, the so called “effort schema” postulated by Weiner and Kukla (1970) says that praise and blame
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are commonly used when the outcome of an action is obviously derived from the effort of the acting person. Ac-
cording to this principle, blame will more likely be expressed if the outcome of an action is linked to low effort. On
the other hand, according to the “compensatory principle” (Kukla, 1972) the evaluating person considers the degree
of effort which is necessary for the specific outcome given a specific ability level. Hence, success will be attributed
to a high ability if the evaluating person assumes that the acting person made less of an effort to reach the positive
outcome. However, if the positive outcome is attributed to high effort, the ability of the acting person will be estimated
as low. In contrast, a negative outcome will be ascribed to low ability if it arises despite of high effort but the acting
person’s ability will be estimated as high if the evaluating person supposes low effort. Consequently, blame for
failure can lead the recipient or an impartial observer to the conclusion that the blaming person estimates the
ability of the blamed person as high but assumes low effort.
Language-Psychological Model
Grice (1975) postulated four maxims jointly expressing the general cooperation principle of conversation (for a
detailed discussion of the maxims see Schwarz, 1996). In short, according to this principle, the recipient of a
message is entitled to expect that the speaker attempts to be informative, clear, relevant, and truthful, meaning
that the speaker and the recipient communicate in an effective and economic way by means of cooperation. Based
on this assumption, Groeben and Blickle (1988) derived an alternative explanation of paradoxical ability estimations:
they argue that the cooperation principle is violated when a teacher gives different verbal feedbacks (praise and
blame) to students who behave identically. The students (or external observers) should recognize this violation
as intended by the teacher and consequently they should try to infer the meaning of the teacher’s statements by
considering the current circumstances (see Blickle, 1993, p. 48). At the end, the students (or the external observers)
may come to the conclusion that the teacher’s intention was to express an estimation of the recipients’ abilities.
Hence, based on language psychology seemingly paradoxical ability estimations can be reconstructed, whereby
the central mechanism is the active construction of sense from the speaker’s messages. In contrast, the attribution
model described above does not postulate such a communicative intention by the speaker. Moreover, after
Reisenzein (1990) had claimed that the language-psychological model of Groeben and Blickle (1988) would suffer
from several substantial shortcomings and obscurities, an empirical study of Reisenzein et al. (1992) raised some
doubts that this model is correct. They compared this model experimentally with the attribution model and only
found support for the latter one. In reaction to this, Groeben and Blickle (1992) asserted that the study by Reisenzein
et al. (1992) suffered frommethodological problems. Reisenzein and Battmann (1992) in turn rejected this criticism
and pointed out that no independent data supporting Groeben and Blickle’s model existed. Finally, Blickle (1993)
softened the strict distinction between the attributional and language-psychological model by partially merging
them (p. 45). Correspondingly, Reisenzein (1990) had previously proposed that the two models do not compete,
but instead are rather integrable.
Expectation Discrepancy Model
Hofer (1985) criticized the attribution model since he believes that no effort calculation (i.e., effort schema) would
be necessary to explain seemingly paradoxical ability estimations. According to the attribution model, the students
(or external observers) must believe that the teacher expresses praise and blame as he (or she) perceived differ-
ences in the students’ efforts. Otherwise, the second process (i.e., the compensatory principle) could not work.
Hofer (1985) performed a study in which two students were treated differently by a teacher (blame vs. praise)
after failure. In addition to this classical scenario, the study participants received the information that both students
had made the same effort. Although the effort schema should not work in this case, Hofer found seemingly para-
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doxical ability estimations. Therefore, he supposed an alternative interference according to which the recipient
(or an external observer) thinks in the following way: “when the teacher believes a pupil is capable of more than
another pupil he expects a better result. If the achieved result is lower than expected the teacher expresses his
disappointment as a blaming utterance” (p. 415). In line with this, a student should be praised if the achieved
result is higher than expected by the teacher. Consequently, this explanation model does not assume a mediating
effort schema. Rather, it assumes a more direct mechanism producing seemingly paradoxical ability estimations:
when giving feedback in a performance setting, it is assumed that the teacher takes into account his beliefs about
the students’ abilities, and these beliefs directly determine the valence of the feedback.
To conclude, all three theoretical approaches describe a plausible mechanism that could produce seemingly
paradoxical ability estimations, i.e., the teacher’s unequal treatment of the students is attributed to differences in
the students’ ability. While the postulated processes differ, all three models converge to this point in the end.
Nonetheless, the majority of studies in the area of praise and blame referred to the attribution model. It is the one
that has been validated more extensively - also in the recent past (e.g., Binser & Försterling, 2004; Möller, 1999).
However, while we must note that there has been unsolved controversy about the mechanisms behind the
seemingly paradoxical effect of praise and blame two decades ago, the existence of this effect is not questioned.
Paradoxical ability estimations revealed in the context of written vignettes describing classroom scenarios (e.g.,
Binser & Försterling, 2004) were replicated with videotaped scenes (Barker & Graham, 1987) and were shown
in experimental studies with a more realistic setting (Meyer, 1982; Meyer, Mittag, & Engler, 1986). Moreover, a
longitudinal study by Tacke and Linder (1981) found that students who were not praised by their teachers, in
contrast to students who were praised for the same responses involving memory, improved their self-concept,
whereby the improvement was domain-specific. Across twelve lessons non-praised students improved their self-
estimated memory ability, but a generalization to other self-concepts such as creativity was not found.
Binser and Försterling (2004) analyzed several studies and reported a mean frequency of 64% of subjects
showing seemingly paradoxical ability estimations, while the frequency differed substantially between studies.
The occurrence of this paradoxical effect of praise and blame depends on several factors which were revealed
in the context of the attribution model: Firstly, it is required that the praising and blaming person knows the ability
of the blamed person (Meyer & Plöger, 1979). Secondly, the probability of the effect is strengthened in the context
of difficult tasks, since effort (and hence the effort schema) does not play a substantial role in simple tasks (Meyer,
Reisenzein, & Dickhäuser, 2004). Thirdly, paradoxical interpretations of teacher-student interactions are boosted
if the evaluating person is asked to think about the teacher’s possible attributions and his/her ability estimation
(Rheinberg & Weich, 1988). However, paradoxical interferences also occurred when ability was not considered
as a possible reason for the teacher’s behavior (Meyer, Bedau, & Engler, 1988). Fourthly, it must be known that
the teacher uses a normative reference system focussing on social comparisons, instead of an individual reference
system for reward (Möller, 1999). Fifthly, the effect is more likely to occur if subjects use an ability-related causal
schema for the interpretation of the teacher’s behavior. In contrast, the paradoxical effect is less likely to occur
when subjects perceive the blame and praise in terms of sympathy (Binser & Försterling, 2004; Meyer et al.,
2004). Finally, the age of those individuals who evaluate the teacher-student interaction is a central factor for
paradoxical ability estimations.
Previous studies considering the potential impact of age were limited to samples of children: results from a study
by Meyer (1978) indicate huge differences between younger and older children regarding the frequency of
seemingly paradoxical ability ratings. León-Villagrá, Meyer, and Engler (1990) systematically compared children
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of different ages and found that children under 9 years do not show seemingly paradoxical ability estimations.
Barker and Graham (1987) suggest that children do not show such effects because they do not apply the com-
pensatory principle. Finally, Rheinberg, and Weich (1988) showed that the frequency of this seemingly paradox-
ical effect increases linearly with age when only considering a range from 13 to 18 years. However, it is still unclear
whether this linear trend remains across the whole lifespan, whether it asymptotically approaches an upper limit,
or if it even decreases at a certain age.
The Present Study
The present study was conducted in order to investigate the effect of seemingly paradoxical ability estimations
across the whole lifespan. It is important to note that previous literature has completely neglected potential effects
of age cohorts in the area of praise and blame. Against this background, the present results would be of importance
for our understanding of the mechanisms behind this seemingly paradoxical phenomenon. If the frequency of this
effect increased across the lifespan, we would have to rethink the tacit idea (shared by the different theoretical
approaches) that an age-invariant cognitive mechanism (with the exception of young children) mediates the
seemingly paradoxical effect of praise and blame across the whole lifespan. Although the level of cognitive devel-
opment should not be the moderating factor in adult age, previous findings suggest age-related differences in
social judgments across the adult lifespan (e.g., Blanchard-Fields, 1994, 1996; Hess & Follett, 1994). Against the
background of the attributional model it is important to note that older adults were found to use different schemas
to explain social behavior (Blanchard-Fields, 1996). All three explanation models described above focus on ability
differences as the cause constituting seemingly paradoxical ability estimations. Binser and Försterling (2004)
broadened the view by also considering potential differences in the teacher’s sympathy for the students as re-
sponsible for the teacher’s praising or blaming remarks. In the present study, we will consider both potential ex-
planations, hereafter referred to as “causal schemas”.
In addition to the usage of different causal schemas, the degree and the quality of judgments are influenced by
the type and content of social dilemmas presented to study participants: Blanchard-Fields (1996) found the vari-
ability in age differences in attributional responding as a function of the specific content domain in question. She
demonstrated age and generational differences in the frequency of different schemas which were produced for
different social dilemmas. For the present study this means we cannot simply derive conclusions from other research
areas. No previous study addressed potential effects of age cohorts on the evaluation of the prototypical scenario
that produces seemingly paradoxical ability estimations: a teacher treats students who behave identically unequally.
Hence, we currently have very little knowledge of the influence of age in the context of this seemingly paradoxical
effect. Therefore, the present study was conducted to scrutinize potential age effects on ability estimations by an
external observer (in this case our study participants) when confronted with the classical classroom scenario
(Meyer et al., 1979). In this scenario one student (A) is praised by a teacher whereas another student (B) is blamed
for equal test performances.
As specific causal schemas might lead to different results in ability estimations, study participants’ (i.e., the external
observers’) explanations for the teacher’s unequal treatment of the students was considered as well as a potential
moderating effect of the observer’s age. In this context, Binser and Försterling (2004) showed that sympathy related
causal schemas reduced the probability of paradoxical ability estimations, whereas differences in sympathy es-
timations increased. Furthermore, in a study by Hofer and Pikowsky (1988) adults reported more often than ad-
olescents that the teacher’s unequal treatment of the students was based on differences in sympathy. Hence, the
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teacher’s sympathy for both students from the perspective of an external observer was also considered. The
procedure was closely modeled on previous studies to allow for comparisons.
The hypotheses in the present study are:
1. In accordance with Binser and Försterling (2004), three subgroups are expected which differ in the direction
of the estimated ability differences (ability rating groups: A < B (seemingly paradoxical effect), A = B, A >
B). In addition to Binser and Försterling, we asked whether the strength of the corresponding ability ratings
is constant across the entire lifespan.
2. The direction of the estimated ability difference is expected to be independent of the evaluator’s age.
3. The praised student is expected to receive higher sympathy ratings in all ability rating groups (as suggested
by Binser and Försterling, 2004), whereby the amount of difference is expected to vary between the ability
rating groups: the difference should be maximal in the group “A > B”. Furthermore, we investigate whether
the strength of estimated sympathy differences is independent of the evaluator’s age within each ability
rating group.
4. Subjects’ explanations (i.e., causal schemas) for the teacher’s unequal treatment of the students will trigger
the signature of the subequent ability and sympathy ratings as previously shown (e.g, Binser & Försterling,
2004; Meyer et al., 2004). In this context, we investigated whether the evaluator’s age influences the
probability of a certain causal schema. Results of a study by Hofer and Pikowsky (1988) suggest that
differences in the teacher’s sympathy for both students would become a more prominent causal schema
with increasing age of the evaluator.
Method
Participants
141 subjects with a mean age of 41.77 years (SD = 27,57; range: 11 - 96) participated. Children under the age
of 11 years were not included as they are not able to show paradoxical ability estimations (León-Villagrá et al.,
1990). We used a German sample and all subjects were native speaker so that they were able to read and under-
stand the written vignette describing the classroom scenario. Children were acquired via a convenient sample in
two schools; young adults were recruited on the university campus. We got access to middle aged adults via
snowball sampling. Older adults and seniors were acquired from a senior sports club. In order to get access to
very old subjects we visited two retirement homes. Prior to the study, the home administration helped us to find
a pre-selection of appropriate subjects (i.e., seniors with clinical mental disorders were excluded to prevent data
biases).
The study conformed with the Code of Ethics of the American Psychological Association, to the Declaration of
Helsinki, and to national guidelines. The study was initiated and coordinated entirely by the authors.
Procedure and Materials
We used a standardized procedure for all participants. They all voluntarily participated in the study and did not
receive incentives. At the beginning of a session, participants were introduced to the topic of the study, but we
did not explain the actual purpose of the study at that time. Then the participants provided some demographic
information. Afterwards, they were asked to carefully read a vignette describing the classical classroom situation
in which a teacher treated two students who behaved identically unequally (e.g., Binser & Försterling, 2004;
Meyer et al., 1979): two students successfully passed an easy test, but the teacher praised only one of them
(student A), whereas the second student (B) was treated neutrally. Both students failed a difficult test, whereby
only student B was blamed. Student A was treated neutrally despite failure. As Groeben and Blickle (1988) discussed
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elaborately, sanctioning statements of a speaker (e.g., “good job” or “oh, not so great”) may be interpreted in dif-
ferent ways. Also, Hofer (1985) emphasized the ambiguity of verbal utterances, especially the potential divergence
between the speaker’s actual intention to praise or blame on the one hand, and the recipient’s perception of the
verbal utterances as praise or blame (or something else) on the other hand. For example, sarcastic communication
can lead to quite different understandings of verbal utterances as illustrated in terms of “blame by praise” and
“praise by blame” (Anolli, Ciceri, & Infantino, 2002). Hence, the recipient does not necessarily infer that specific
utterances are signatures of praise or blame, respectively. In order to overcome this interpretation problem, we
created a scenario in which we directly spoke of a teacher who is praising and blaming students (in German the
corresponding verbs “loben” and “tadeln” are very unambiguous). In order to make the scenario more compre-
hensible, especially for the young participants, we introduced line-drawing figures depicting the conditions as
done by León-Villagrá et al. (1990). After they had read the scenario, participants were asked to report the reason
that could explain the teacher’s unequal treatment of the students. These causal schemas underlying the observers’
subsequent judgments were investigated by open-ended questions (cf. Binser & Försterling, 2004; Blickle, 1991;
Möller 1999; Rheinberg & Weich, 1988). This is important to mention because a closed item format may prime
specific ability estimations. Finally, participants answered two questions by rating on a scale from 1 (“very low”)
to 9 (“very high”): “How high does the teacher assess the ability of student A/B?” and “How high is the teacher’s
sympathy for student A/B?” (these are approximate translations of the original German wording). This single item
format was selected in accordance with previous studies (e.g., Binser & Försterling, 2004; Blickle, 1991; Möller,
1999), and the 9-point scale was chosen to compare absolute rating values in the present study with those found
by Binser and Försterling (2004). A small pre-test with some children showed, however, that it was mandatory to
change wording for them because they had some problems to correctly understand the words “ability” and “sym-
pathy”. We substituted these words and asked instead how smart/clever/intelligent does the teacher think the
students are, and how much the teacher would like the students, respectively (the German wording we used was
unambiguous). The sequence of ability and sympathy rating was counterbalanced across participants to prevent
sequence effects.
Data Analysis
The reported explanations for the teacher’s unequal treatment of the students were categorized following a two-
step procedure (Kaspar, Hamborg, Sackmann, & Hesselmann, 2010; Kaspar & König, 2011). This procedure first
includes a categorization by two independent raters with the aid of a given category-system consisting of four
categories:
• “ability”: the teacher’s unequal treatment of students is attributed to ability: participants assume that the
teacher treats the students unequally because they differ in their general ability.
• “sympathy”: participants’ statements address sympathy but no ability aspects.
• “ability/sympathy”: participants reported ability-related reasons as well as sympathy reasons.
• “residual”: participants reported other reasons such as selective discrimination, pedagogical inability or
more exotic explanations.
The categories were selected following Binser and Försterling (2004) who, however, used an additional category
for explanations which did not differentiate between ability and previous performance. This category did not provide
a more specific result pattern but may have lowered the discriminatory power of the entire category system. The
inter-rater-reliability in the present study was very high (Cohen’s Kappa = .95) and in the few cases of absent
agreement a consensual categorization was forced in the second step to allow frequency analyses.
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In order to statistically test our hypotheses, we focused on the ability and sympathy ratings and additionally took
participants’ ages as well as the causal schemas into consideration. For this, a moderated regression analysis
and variance analytic approaches were used.Whenever important statistical assumptions were not fulfilled, reduced
regression models or non-parametrical tests were applied. Initially, we calculated difference values with respect
to the ability and sympathy rating, respectively. The ability rating for the blamed student B (“How high does the
teacher assess the ability of student B”) was subtracted from the corresponding rating for the praised student A.
The same difference was calculated for the sympathy ratings (“How high is the teacher’s sympathy for student
A/B”).
Results
Ability Ratings (Hypotheses 1, 2)
In accordance with Binser and Försterling (2004) we found three subgroups differing in the signature of their
ability ratings. A substantial subsample of 59 participants (43.2%) rated student B’s ability higher than student A’s
ability (ability rating group: A < B), therefore showing the seemingly paradoxical effect. A second group of 65
subjects (46.8%) showed the reverse effect (A > B), and a third small group of 14 subjects (10.1%) showed no
difference in the ability ratings (A = B). Hence, the ability rating group was introduced as an additional factor in
subsequent analyses.
In order to clarify whether the strength of the corresponding ability ratings was constant across the whole lifespan,
a moderated regression analyses was computed. The difference in the ability ratings (Aminus B) served as criterion.
The evaluator’s (i.e., participant’s) age was treated as a continuous predictor and the ability rating groups as a
moderator in terms of dummy variables. Each dummy coded level of the moderator was additionally crossed with
age to test for a potential interaction between rating groups and age. For this, group “A > B” was selected as the
reference group. In addition, the analysis was done without the ability rating group “A = B” due to problems of
multicollinearity (VIF > 10).
Both multiple regression analyses (bothR = 922, p < .001] revealed a significant predictive value of the evaluators’
age as depicted in Table 1. The dummy variable for the group showing a paradox ability estimation “A < B” had
a significant predictive value which was moderated by participants’ age. The group showing the reverse ability
estimation “A > B” (reference group) differed by about eight rating points. The significant interaction term indicates
that the slope of the ability rating on age in group “A < B” was .022 rating points greater than the slope of the
ability rating on age in the reference group “A > B”. In order to illustrate this differential effect of age on ability es-
timations, bivariate regressions were computed separately for both groups (seemingly paradoxical effect “A < B”:
R = .070, B = .004, p = .596; non-paradoxical effect “A > B”: R = -.276, B = -.018, p = .026) and depicted by
scatter plots (Figure 1, left side). Also, rating group “A = B” differed significantly from group “A > B”.
In summary, all groups differed significantly in their ability ratings, whereby the value of the seemingly paradoxical
rating effect (A < B) remained constant across the whole lifespan in contrast to the value of the reversed effect
(A > B) that decreased with age.
Europe's Journal of Psychology
2013, Vol. 9(2), 304–318
doi:10.5964/ejop.v9i2.540
The Paradoxical Effect of Praise and Blame 310
Table 1
Result of the Multiple Regression Analysis
Sympathy ratingAbility rating
ptbptbVariable
Age .046*.016-2.026-.028*.228-2.018-
Ability rating group "A < B" .016*.434-2.997-1.001***<.121-16.135-8
Age x Ability rating group "A < B" .660.441-.008-.050*.9781.022
Ability rating group "A = B" .408.830.1052.006**.781-2.227-4
Age x Ability rating group "A = B" .152.441-1.051-.402.842.018
Reduced regression analysis without group "A = B"
Age .047*.001-2.021*.337-2
Ability rating group "A < B" .017*.416-2.001***<.907-16
Age x Ability rating group "A < B" .662.438-.040*.074-2
Note. Results of the multiple regression testing the moderating effect of the ability rating group (A < B, A = B, and A > B) on participants’ age
regarding the ability rating and the sympathy rating. The moderator “rating group” was dummy coded, whereby group “A > B” served as the
reference group. The t and p values for the reduced regression analysis (without group “A = B) are also depicted.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
Figure 1. Scatter plots of participants’ ability and sympathy ratings depending on age, and depicted regarding the three ability
rating groups (A < B, A = B, A > B).
Note. The difference between the ability ratings for students A and B is shown on the left side, the rating difference in the
teacher’s sympathy for students A and B on the right side. Regression lines for all three ability rating groups are marked
(dashed line: A < B; dotted line: A = B; solid line: A > B).
According to hypothesis 2, the direction of the rating effect was expected to be independent of the evaluator’s
age. However, this was not the case: the mean age differed between the rating groups (Kruskal-Wallis test: χ2(2)
= 19.385, p < .001). Post-hoc pairwise comparisons by means of Mann-Whitney U tests showed no difference in
age between groups “A < B” (M = 40.66, SD = 26.86) and “A > B” (M = 35.20, SD = 24.89; p = .222). However,
both groups were younger on average than the ability rating group “A = B” (M = 73.35, SD = 21.32; both p < .001).
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Sympathy Ratings (Hypothesis 3)
Regarding the sympathy ratings, the same moderated regression analysis as above was computed: R = 515, p
< .001. Again, the regression analysis was also done without the ability rating group “A = B” due to problems of
multicollinearity:R = 496, p < .001. Table 1 depicts the results. As expected, higher sympathy ratings were observed
for the praised student in all ability rating groups but the difference between both students decreased with parti-
cipants’ age. This decrease was not moderated by the ability rating group. Moreover, the difference in sympathy
estimation was maximal in the ability rating group “A > B” which differed significantly from the group showing the
paradoxical ability estimation (A < B). Figure 1 (right side) depicts the corresponding scatter plots.
Analysis of Causal Schemas (Hypothesis 4)
Finally, we focused on the reported explanations for the unequal treatment of the students by the teacher. In order
to clarify whether these causal schemas primed the subsequent ability and sympathy ratings in a specific way,
we analyzed the ratings regarding the four categories used to classify the schemas. With respect to the ability
ratings, differences between categories were present (Kruskal-Wallis test: χ2 (3) = 12.779; p = .005) (Figure 2,
left side). Post-hoc pairwise comparisons of schema categories bymeans of U-tests revealed a significant difference
between those participants reporting ability reasons for the teacher’s behavior and participants reporting another
reason (all U ≥ 288.500; all p ≤ .034).
Figure 2. Participants’ ratings of the students’ ability (left side) and the teacher’s sympathy for the students (right side) depending
on participants’ previously reported reason for the teacher’s behavior (praising student A, but blaming student B).
Note: Categories: “ability” = participants’ statements addressed ability aspects but no sympathy aspects; “ability/sympathy” =
sympathy and ability aspects were reported; “sympathy” = statements addressed sympathy but no ability aspects; “residual”
= an absence of any ability or sympathy aspects. Each participant was assigned to one of the four categories. Significant group
differences are drawn in (αadj = .008). Vertical lines above bars indicate standard error of the mean.
Regarding sympathy ratings we also found differences between subjects using different causal schemas (Kruskal-
Wallis-test: χ2 (3) = 26.517; p < .001) (Figure 2, right side). When only ability reasons were reported, the non-
significant difference in sympathy ratings (t(19) = 1.522; p = .145) was significantly lower than when sympathy
reasons were mentioned additionally (U = 144,500; all p < .001), or when sympathy reasons were reported exclus-
ively (U = 173,000; all p < .001). Hence, when sympathy reasons were mentioned the teacher’s sympathy for the
praised student A was rated as greater than his sympathy for the blamed student B. Moreover, participants who
mentioned neither ability nor sympathy reasons (group “residual”) showed a significant difference in sympathy
ratings (t(23) = 3.685; p = .001) which in turn was significantly smaller than in the two groups of participants
mentioning sympathy reasons (both U ≥ 329.500; both p ≤ .025).
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In summary, an ability-related causal schema facilitated the occurrence of seemingly paradoxical ability estimations
but diminished differences in perceived sympathy. The reversed ability rating was shown by those participants
reporting sympathy but no ability reasons.
Moreover, we found differences in age between categories (Kruskal-Wallis-test: χ2 (3) = 22.381; p < .001) which
were compared in pairs using U-tests. Participants mentioning only sympathy reasons (mean age = 38.24, SD =
25.54) and those who additionally reported ability reasons (M = 29.27, SD = 21.64) differed nearly significantly
(Z = -1.960 p = .050). Both groups were younger than participants who exclusively reported ability reasons (M =
53.55, SD = 26.86) (both Z ≥ -2.125, both p ≤ .034) and also younger than those participants who did not mention
any ability or sympathy aspects (M = 59.62, SD = 29.07) (both Z ≥ -2.826, both p ≤ .005). Finally, subjects belonging
to the residual category group did not differ in age from those mentioning exclusive ability-related explanations
(Z = -.976, p = .329).
In order to ascertain whether seemingly paradoxical ability estimations necessarily followed whenever participants’
ratings were based on an ability-related causal schema, we statistically compared the number of participants
showing the seemingly paradoxical ability rating (A < B) with the number of participants showing the reversed
ability rating (A > B) in each statement category by means of Chi squared tests. Participants using an ability-related
causal schema showed the seemingly paradoxical ability rating more often than not (n = 15 vs. n = 4; χ2(1) =
6.368, p = .012). Participants assigned to the sympathy category showed the reversed ability rating more often
than not (n = 17 vs. n = 32; χ2(1) = 4.592, p = .032). Regarding the other two categories, we did not find any dif-
ferences (both χ2(1) ≤ 1.471, both p ≥ .225). Consequently, the occurrence of seemingly paradoxical ability estim-
ations was primed by previously mentioned ability reasons which were sometimes, however, followed by non-
paradoxical ratings. Moreover, the seemingly paradoxical ability rating also occurred even when participants did
not mention any ability aspects as relevant for the unequal treatment of students.
Discussion
We found large differences in ability ratings in both directions on the level of subgroups (ability rating groups) as
suggested by previous studies (e.g., Binser & Försterling, 2004; Meyer et al., 2004; Möller, 1999). Thereby, the
value of seemingly paradoxical ability ratings (A < B) remained constant across the whole lifespan, whereas the
value of the reversed effect (A > B) decreased with age (hypothesis 1). Hence, the linear increase of the frequency
of this seemingly paradoxical effect found by Rheinberg and Weich (1988) did not continue across the adult age.
Moreover, the probability of both effect directions was independent of the evaluator’s age but a small third group
estimating no ability difference between the students (A = B) was about 35 years older on average (hypothesis
2). Consequently, the occurrence of seemingly paradoxical ability ratings did not depend on the age of adults,
except very young children as previously shown (Barker and Graham, 1987; León-Villagrá et al., 1990).
Interestingly, we found an overall trend with respect to sympathy ratings: in accordance with hypothesis 3, the
teacher’s sympathy for the praised student was rated significantly higher than his sympathy for the blamed student
in all ability rating groups, but the difference between both students decreased with the study participants’ age.
This decrease was not moderated by the ability rating group, but the difference in sympathy estimation was
maximal in the group “A > B” as previously found by Binser and Försterling (2004).
With respect to hypothesis 4, an ability-related causal schema facilitated the occurrence of subsequent paradox-
ical ability estimations (A < B), but it diminished differences in perceived sympathy. Participants who reported
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sympathy but not ability reasons for the teacher’s unequal treatment of the students showed the opposite direction
in ability estimation (A > B) – on average. This non-paradoxical ability estimation was paralleled by larger differences
between the teacher’s sympathy for both students. On average, the teacher’s sympathy for the praised student
A was rated higher than his/her sympathy for the blamed student B, independent of the used causal schema.
Moreover, participants who expressed a sympathy related causal schemawere younger on average than participants
who mentioned other explanations for the teacher’s behavior. This result pattern contradicts what Hofer and
Pikowsky (1988) found over two decades ago. In their study, adults in contrast to adolescents reported more often
that the teacher’s unequal treatment of the students would base on differences in sympathy. The present results
suggest that older individuals are more ability-oriented when interpreting teacher-student interactions. In fact,
age-related differences in schemas underlying social judgments have been found previously regarding several
social situations (Blanchard-Fields, 1996).
All in all, the occurrence of seemingly paradoxical ability estimations was significantly primed by previously men-
tioned ability reasons. However, the occurrence of the reversed effect was also found on the base of ability-related
schemas. Moreover, seemingly paradoxical ability ratings also occurred even when participants did not mention
any ability aspects as relevant for the teacher’s unequal treatment of the students. This result pattern suggests
that seemingly paradoxical ability estimations are not completely determined by the causal schema used to explain
the teacher’s behavior. This result does not favor one of the above-described explanation models, namely the
attribution model, the model of language-psychological sense construction, or the expectancy discrepancy model.
As outlined, in all three theoretical models, the teacher’s unequal treatment of the students is finally ascribed to
the teacher’s belief that one student is more capable than the other. It should also be noted that we can exclude
potential differences in the participants’ interpretation of the teacher’s utterances (the central point in the language-
psychological model), because we did not use specific verbal utterances to describe praise and blame. Rather,
we relieved our study participants from the interpretation process as we created a scenario in which we directly
spoke of a teacher who is praising and blaming students. Consequently, the cognitive mechanisms underlying
paradoxical effects of praise and blame seem to be multi-factorial. The present results contradict a simple priming
mechanism. An ability-related causal schema does not necessarily lead to seemingly paradoxical ability estimations
but their value remained constant across the whole lifespan. Against this background, we need a revision of the
current explanation models. From our point of view, each of them has its value but none of them provide reliable
predictions. Perhaps it will be fruitful to create a more complex theoretical model instead to strive for less complexity
as Hofer (1985) did with his expectation discrepancy model. However, before we will be able to formulate an
elaborated model, future research should systematically compare the existing models on the one hand, since
there has been only little endeavour to systematically compare the models so far. On the other hand, we need
much more insight in the constraints which determine the occurrence of seemingly paradoxical ability estimations.
Overall, the presented data show that seemingly paradoxical ability estimations occur in all age groups, whereby
the value of the seemingly paradoxical ability estimation remains constant across the entire lifespan. Thereby,
older people show a preference for ability-related explanations when interpreting evaluative behavior. At the same
time, sympathy differences between recipients of blame and praise, respectively, become less important with age.
Hence, the evaluating person (e.g., a teacher, a superior, or a teammate) should carefully weigh the use of praise
and blame in performance settings. This becomes especially important when a normative reference system is
used focussing on social comparisons instead of an individual reference system for reward (Möller, 1999). Indeed,
we should remember that the phenomenon of seemingly paradoxical ability estimations is not only an interesting
effect that is worth to be addressed by basic research. From our point of view, it is even more important to consider
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the motivational consequences which, for example, arise from the impression that a praising person believes that
the recipient has a low ability in a certain domain.
In this context, further studies should also scrutinize whether the presented results can be generalized to other
social interactions beyond the classroom scenario. Although most studies in the area of praise and blame have
focused on teacher-student interactions in classroom scenarios so far, the results and implications can probably
be generalized to other contexts in which performance and achievement motivation play a central role. Therefore,
it is also important to further scrutinize the specific ability dimensions which are sensitive to seemingly paradoxical
effects of praise and blame. Hofer (1985) did not find paradoxical effects with regard to students’ ability to concen-
trate, their diligence, or their forgetfulness. The majority of the previous studies focused on (partially unspecific)
task performances.
Furthermore, it would be interesting to see whether the seemingly paradoxical effect of praise and blame is culture-
specific, or whether the causal schemas used to explain this phenomenon depend on cultural features. Perhaps
we would find interactions between cultural specifics and certain ability domains.
Finally, we want to point out that most of the previous literature on praise and blame exclusively focused on verbal
utterances. However, non-verbal cues also play a crucial role in communication, especially when interpreting
ambiguous verbal messages. Non-verbal cues are not limited to facial expressions and gestures, but also include
bodily sensations. Our evaluation of others significantly depend on incidental bodily sensations such as weight
and texture (Ackerman, Nocera, & Bargh, 2010; Kaspar & Krull, 2013), and on incidental bodily interactions with
the environment: for example, Kaspar (2013) recently showed that washing one’s hands after failure in a perform-
ance setting enhanced optimism but hampered future performance in the same task domain. Perhaps, such incid-
ental sensations also affect the way in which praise and blame are expressed and perceived. It could be very
fruitful if research on praise and blame considered such variables to reveal the potential constraints of seemingly
paradoxical effects and to build up a comprehensive theory. In the present study we presented a scenario description
to our participants so that we exclude concrete verbal utterances and body language of the protagonists (except
very rough line drawings). Thus, we probably reduced the inter-subject variance in the understanding of the
scenario, but we also reduced the ecological validity of the situation at the same time. Under real-life circumstances
any interaction between the sender of a message and its recipient is a multi-level process. This is important to
consider with respect to the practical implications of the present research and regarding the design of future
studies.
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